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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1935 
 ___________ 
 
 EDWARD LEON BOONE, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
MR. NOSE, Captain; MR. MACKY, Hearing Examiner;   
        PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PAROLE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-01370) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Cynthia Reed Eddy  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 3, 2013 
 Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  July 11, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Edward Leon Boone, a pro se Pennsylvania prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit.  We will affirm. 
 Proceeding in forma pauperis, Boone filed suit in September 2012, naming as 
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defendants Captain Sean Nose, Hearing Examiner Macky, Pennsylvania Board of 
Probation and Parole secretary Kimberly Barkley, Emily Sanso, John K. McMurray, and 
the Board itself.  Later, Boone had Barkley, Sanso, and McMurray stricken as defendants, 
and then amended and supplemented his complaint to expand upon his original 
allegations and to add newer developments and additional defendants (albeit by 
implication).1
 Boone’s allegations are based on two distinct-yet-interlocking sequences of 
events.  After being granted parole, but before he was actually released on parole, Boone 
was accused of writing a threatening letter to Marie Denny, and he received an associated 
misconduct citation from Captain Nose.  Boone insisted he was innocent and claimed that 
another inmate had framed him.  In his complaint, Boone describes a protracted review 
process beginning in June 2012, which included at least three hearings and involved some 
cross examination of Nose, although Boone allegedly was prevented from calling certain 
witnesses or retaining handwriting experts.  The misconduct was initially sustained; as a 
result, Boone was confined to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU).  He claimed that his 
time there “contributed” to his physical and mental deterioration and imposed upon him 
  Boone sought significant compensatory and punitive damages. 
                                                 
1 The later complaint may be considered a “supplement” as well as an “amendment” 
because it included allegations about conduct taking place after the original complaint 
was filed.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 
1185, 1188 (3d Cir. 1979).  Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners may file 
supplemental complaints if the claims in question 1) have truly accrued since the 
beginning of the suit and 2) are exhausted per 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) before the 
supplement is filed.  See Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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restrictions (such as on religious expression and mail privileges) that violated his 
constitutional rights.  Moreover, as a result of the sustained misconduct, he lost his 
favorable grant of parole.   
However, after several rounds of appellate review, the initial misconduct was 
exonerated in September 2012.  Despite this, Boone has still not been released on parole, 
although he has made the Board aware of the outcome.  He believed that the Board 
refused to reinstate his parole because it is retaliating against him for filing suit.   
 The District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Boone had failed to 
state claims upon which relief could be granted.  See generally Boone v. Nose, No. 2:12-
1370, 2013 WL 819730 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2013).  The Court also denied his two post-
judgment motions.   
Boone timely appeals.2
 We agree with most of the District Court’s opinion, and will affirm for 
substantially the same reasons recited therein.  Boone’s claims relating to the misconduct 
citation, and the hearings that followed in its wake, are undermined by his failure to show 
that his brief confinement in the RHU imposed atypical and significant hardship on him 
  He has filed a motion to expand the record and a motion 
for appointment of counsel.   
                                                 
2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review.  See 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We accept all well-pleaded 
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Boone’s favor.  Capogrosso v. 
Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citation omitted).  Pro se 
filings are to be construed liberally.  Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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such that his right to due process was implicated.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 
484 (1995).  To the extent that a loss of parole resulted from the incident, a “protected 
liberty interest may arise from only one of two sources: the Due Process Clause or the 
laws of a state.” Asquith v. Dep’t of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).  The United 
States Constitution does not itself establish a liberty interest in parole.  Newman v. Beard, 
617 F.3d 775, 783 (3d Cir. 2010).  While Boone had been granted parole, he had not yet 
been released at the time of the hearings.  And in Pennsylvania, “a prisoner does not have 
a protected liberty interest, or due process rights, in parole until the inmate is actually 
released on parole.”  Nieves v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 995 A.2d 412, 418 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2010), aff’d, 613 Pa. 366 (Pa. 2011) (per curiam).   
Boone’s First Amendment access-to-the-courts and religion claims were not well 
pleaded.  See Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citations omitted).  He merely recited the relevant causes of action, and did not specify, 
for example, how he was prevented from litigating a potentially meritorious claim.  See 
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).  The Eighth Amendment claim fared 
similarly. 
We depart from the District Court’s analysis somewhat with regard to Boone’s 
First Amendment retaliation claim.  We agree with the Court’s recitation of the 
appropriate standard, see Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Rauser v. 
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001), but note that the dismissal stage generally does 
not allow for the “burden-shifting” element of the test; and, because the plaintiff merely 
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needs to sufficiently plead a retaliation claim, he is not required to “prove” anything to 
survive a motion to dismiss or sua sponte screening.  Although the District Court’s 
reasoning is likely still supportable, we will instead affirm on the basis that Boone failed 
to show how the cognizable-under-section 1983 defendants (both those named in the 
caption and those discussed in the text of his complaints) were personally involved in any 
retaliation against him.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Boone’s “failure to supervise” claim is conclusory and not well pleaded. 
Finally, we agree with the District Court that further leave to amend would be 
futile.  Boone’s subsequent submissions and declarations have not suggested that he 
would be able to cure the defects identified above, and he already amended once after the 
defendants filed their first motion to dismiss.  The Court did not abuse its discretion in 
disallowing further amendment.  See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000).3
Finding no substantial question presented by this appeal, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
  
Nor did it abuse its discretion by denying Boone’s post-judgment motions.  See Cureton 
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2001); Lorenzo v. Griffith, 
12 F.3d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 1993). 
                                                 
3 As demonstrated by his submissions on appeal, Boone’s claims continue to evolve, in 
some cases attacking conduct that post-dated both his original and 
amended/supplemented complaints.  Although the District Court could have permitted 
further amendment, it was not required to do so.  Nor can we fault the Court for ruling on 
what was properly in front of it at the dismissal stage.  See Smith-Bey v. Hosp. Adm’r, 
841 F.2d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing limits to liberal construction). 
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curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  Boone’s pending motions are 
denied. 
